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The New Business Rule and Compensation for Lost Profits
Victor Goldberg
In the late 1960’s, the movers and shakers of Buffalo determined that their
football team, the Bills, needed a new domed stadium. The County entered into a contract
with Kenford, a firm owned by a local landowner, Ed Cottrell, who teamed up with Judge
Roy Hofheinz (the creator and operator of the Houston Astrodome, the first domed
stadium). They would provide the land for the stadium in exchange for a management
contract. They also owned the adjacent land and intended to develop it after the stadium
was built. The expected cost of the stadium was $50 million; however, when the
construction bids came in, the low bid was $72 million. That was too much for the
County, so it cancelled its plan to build the stadium, whereupon Kenford sued for breach
of contract. Kenford won on liability and the damage issue went to trial—a very long
(nine-month) trial.1 Kenford hired a team of economic experts to determine damages.
Had the stadium been built, it argued, it would have developed the peripheral land with a
theme park, three hotels, four office buildings, a golf course, and a specialty retail center.
The team of experts spent months testifying giving their projections of future costs and
revenues on a year-by-year basis for twenty years, concluding that the lost profits from
this component of damages alone was over $380 million. Total claims exceeded $500
million.2 When the dust had cleared, Kenford received $10 million, none of that for those
lost profits.3
As a matter of sound policy the denial was correct, although the trial judge got
there with a dubious argument, which I need not reproduce here.4 Kenford’s lost profit
claim faced a doctrinal hurdle—the so-called new business rule. If a business did not
have a history of profitable operations, it would have been denied recovery for lost profits.
Not so long ago, most American jurisdictions followed this per se rule. That has changed.
In his treatise, Robert Dunn summarized the change: “The first edition of this book
described the new-business rule as a ‘majority rule’ and the rejection of the new-business
rule as a ‘minority rule.’ The trend in the cases since 1978 is unmistakable. The modern
decisions … demonstrate an increased rejection of the traditional new business rule. The
majority and minority rules are now the other way around.”5 Likewise, Farnsworth stated
that the rule “has been largely abandoned.”6 The per se rule still exists in some
jurisdictions, notably New York (although, as we shall see, the New York courts have
tied themselves up in knots in an effort to apply the per se rule).

1

The litigation dragged on for eighteen years. For details, see Goldberg, Rethinking Contract Law and
Contract Design, ch. 9.
2
They also argued that if the stadium had been built they would have been able to entice a major league
baseball team (possibly the New York Yankees) to come. The expert opined that the lost profits arising
from the failure to buy the Yankees was $146 million.
3
Kenford Company v. Erie County 73 N.Y. 2d 312 (1989).
4
For details see Rethinking 102-3.
5 Robert Dunn, Recovery of Damages for Lost Profits, § 4.3 at 391.
6 Farnsworth treatise, § 12.15 at 272.
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The prevailing wisdom nowadays accepts Dunn’s notion that a new business is no
different than an existing one. “What the earlier cases perceived as a rule of law has been
replaced in the cases cited by a rule of evidence. The rule of evidence is far preferable. . . .
The trend in the modern cases is plainly toward replacing the old rule of law with a rule
of evidence—the unquestionable principle that damages for loss of profits must be
proven with reasonable certainty.”7
However, I want to argue, the prevailing wisdom is wrong. The damages for a
new business ought not be viewed as merely a matter of whether the evidence is
sufficient to surmount the “reasonable certainty” hurdle. By not appreciating the
underlying economics, the courts have lumped together a disparate set of problems under
the new business rubric and attempted to treat them all alike. For some, like the Kenford
claimants, I would argue, the zero compensation result would be appropriate; for others
not. Unpacking the concept results in a more nuanced approach to measuring damages. In
particular, it calls into question a common refrain in contracts discourse, namely, that the
damage rules result in systematic undercompensation.8 I will argue that the increased
liberality in awarding lost profits to new businesses has, in many instances resulted in
overcompensation. All the errors are not, however, in one direction; in other contexts
application of the rule has (or would have) resulted in undercompensation.
To get a better handle on this, I will break down the case law into four categories.
These are stylized in that actual cases might not fit completely within a single box. There
is a class of cases in which the appropriate new business award is zero, but the courts
have drawn the line in the wrong place. The crucial issue is not the lack of a track record
or whether damages can be proved with “reasonable certainty”; rather the focus should be
on the expected return on a new investment (whether by a new or existing business).
These cases can be characterized by Terry Malloy’s plaintive cry: “I could’ve been a
contender.”9 Following a breach, the plaintiff, who has done nothing in reliance, claims
that, but for the breach, I would have done X and I would have made a lot of money by
doing so. As one court said: “Most contracts are motivated by the expectation of future
profits. If such profits are within the contemplation of the parties at the time the contract
is made, they may form the measure of damage.”10 Why then should the plaintiff not be
compensated? The simple answer is that the damage remedy has to take account of the
opportunity cost of capital. Since there is no reason to believe that this particular
investment would have been more profitable than any alternative use of the funds that the
plaintiff saved because the deal cratered, there would be no loss. Thus, returning to the
7 Dunn, § 4.3 at 392. “[T]he distinction between established businesses and new ones …goes to the weight
of the evidence.” Dobbs. __.
8 Alan Schwartz, The Case for Specific Performance, 89 Yale L.J. 271, 275-76 (1979); Steven Shavell, Is
Breach of Contract Immoral? 56 Emory L.J. 439, 451 (2006); Douglas G. Baird, The Young Astronomers,
74 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1641, 1650 (2007); Melvin Aron Eisenberg, The Principle of Hadley v. Baxendale, 80
Cal. L. Rev. 563, 610-11 (1992); Tess Wilkinson-Ryan & David A. Hoffman, Breach Is for Suckers, 63
Vand. L. Rev. 1003, 1006 (2010); David W. Carroll, A Little Essay in Partial Defense of the ContractMarket Differential As A Remedy for Buyers, 57 S. Cal. L. Rev. 667, 680-81 (1984).
9 Terry Malloy (aka Marlon Brando), On the Waterfront.
10 Larsen v. Walton Plywood Co., 65 Wash. 2d 1, 15, 390 P.2d 677, 686 adhered to sub nom. Larsen v.
Walton Plywood Co., 65 Wash. 2d 1, 396 P.2d 879 (1964).
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domed stadium that wasn’t, Kenford still had the funds it would have invested in the
hotels, golf course, and other projects. It could have invested the funds in other projects
and there was no reason to believe that one set of projects was better or worse than the
other.11 This argument will be developed (and qualified) in Section I.
In the second category of cases, the owner of some intellectual property licenses it
to a party who fails to exploit it. Suppose that part of the licensor’s compensation was
contingent, perhaps in the form of a royalty, and the licensor proved that the licensee
breached by failing to exploit the property. The damages would be the royalties on the
projected sales. Unlike in the first case, the licensor has already made its investment.
Unless the contract has a liquidated damages clause or some other restriction on recovery
(and contracts often do) the damages should be recoverable. As we shall see below, the
New York per se rule against awarding lost profits for new businesses has conflated these
cases with the first category resulting in some very convoluted reasoning. These cases,
and their interplay with the other categories, will be analyzed in Section II.
Third, the promisor could have delayed performance or provided a defective
product. Perhaps a construction project comes on line a few months late, a delivery
arrives late, or the seller breaches a warranty. In these cases, performance eventually does
take place. This category puts us squarely in the Hadley v. Baxendale world. Depending
on the facts, one could make a strong case for outcomes ranging from no compensation to
expectation damages.12 This class of case will be analyzed in Section III.
Finally, I will consider the buyer’s anticipatory repudiation of a long-term
contract in which the seller has partially performed. The seller’s ability to recover lost
profits should, I will argue, depend on neither the newness of the business nor the
reasonable certainty of the damage calculations. If there had been no change in market
conditions there should be no recovery for lost profits. If market conditions had changed,
lost profits should be recoverable. However, the recovery should be for direct, not
consequential, damages. In Section IV, I will elaborate on why that makes a difference.
The “new business rule,” therefore, should not be thought of as a single rule. By
stuffing these different types of problems into a single box, courts and commentators
undermined the rationale for the rule, even for those cases in which the rule made sense.
The courts have deployed some devices on an ad hoc basis—notably “reasonable
11

The two principals were highly leveraged so that their future spending would most likely have been
funded by debt. The principals did own, or have options on, adjacent land. As I note in the next section,
owning a complementary asset can make the investment more valuable than alternatives. However, the
value of the new structures would have been reflected in the land value. The experts also claimed the
potential appreciation in value of that land as a separate source of damages; including both would have
been double counting. In the end, the Court of Appeals denied recovery for the lost land value appreciation
as well; see Kenford Co., Inc. v. Erie Cnty., 73 N.Y. 2d 312 (1989).
12 Judge Posner recognized this in his decision in Mindgames v. Western Publishing Co. 218 F.3d 652,
655. “The rule of Hadley v. Baxendale, 9 Ex. 341, 156 Eng. Rep. 145 (1854), often prevents the victim of a
breach of contract from obtaining lost profits, but that rule is not invoked here. Neither the ‘new business’
rule nor the rule of Hadley v. Baxendale stands for the general proposition that lost profits are never a
recoverable item of damages in a tort or breach of contract case.”
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certainty” determining whether the claimant’s business is truly new—as wild cards to
justify awarding damages to some plaintiffs but not others.
I.

Opportunity Cost

Suppose that when the promisor breached a contract the promisee had done nothing at
all in reliance. The promisee then claims that, but for the breach, it would have done
something that would have been profitable and it has lost the profits from that activity.
Suppose further that the promisee has no complementary assets that would have made
this activity uniquely valuable. At the time of the breach it had not yet invested any
money, but it was going to do so and, it claims, it would have been successful. It would
then bring in expert witnesses who would testify as to how much would have been earned.
These foregone earnings for these “stillborn enterprises” would be the “lost profits.”13
The relevant question should not be whether the project would make money but
whether it would make more money than the next best alternative. The investment might
have turned out to be wildly successful or a dismal failure, but there is no a priori reason
to believe that the expected rate of return would exceed the going market rate. After the
breach the promisee still has the money that it would otherwise have invested in the
project and it would be free to do anything it wants with those funds. The expected value
of the specific project would be the same as the market rate, so the promisee’s loss would
be zero. I need not qualify this by comparing the riskiness of the particular project with
the market rate since the opportunity cost of the funds takes the relative riskiness into
account. For this class of cases the per se rule—no compensation—makes sense.
By not recognizing this simple point, the courts have allowed plaintiffs, like Kenford,
to introduce evidence of losses that would substantially overcompensate them. Since the
damage claims are usually treated as questions of fact, not law, the courts, with no
coherent theory to deal with the claims, allow many of them to succeed, or at least to get
to the jury. Even if the claims would ultimately be denied they could have significant
effects. They raise the costs of litigation if expert testimony can be given to prove the
alleged loss.14 In the Kenford litigation hundreds of thousands of dollars (millions today,
adjusted for inflation) and months of juror’s time were wasted by expert witness
13 The term is from Roger I. Abrams Donald Welsch Bruce Jonas, “Stillborn Enterprises: Calculating
Expectation Damages Using Forensic Economics,” 57 Ohio St. L.J. 809.
14 In an antitrust case Judge Posner disparaged the damage claims by the expert witness:
The projection of lost profits that Olympia’s expert witness made to the jury bore no
relation to Olympia’s internal business planning or to economic reality. . . . It is thus one
more illustration of the old problem of expert witnesses who are “often the mere paid
advocates or partisans of those who employ and pay them, as much so as the attorneys
who conduct the suit. There is hardly anything, not palpably absurd on its face, that
cannot now be proved by some so-called ‘experts.’ ” . . . The expert in this case dazzled
the jury with “an array of figures conveying a delusive impression of exactness,”—
delusive because the figures had no relation to reality. (Olympia Equipment Leasing Co.
v. Western Union Telegraph Co., 797 F.2d 370 (1986)).
Of course, not all expert witnesses behave this way; I am occasionally in that role and I hope that I am
objective. Nonetheless, as we shall see in some of the cases discussed below, the experts do often engage in
stretching the truth.
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testimony. In addition, uncertainty over whether a court (trial or appeal) would accept the
evidence would affect the settlement value.15 In the remainder of this subsection, I will
provide some examples from the case law of attempts by plaintiffs to assert lost profit
claims for stillborn projects.
1.

Fera v. Village Plaza16

The case appears in a number of casebooks and is oft-cited by other courts as an
illustration of a modern court recognizing the lost profits of a business that had not yet
begun to operate.17 Fera intended to open a “book and bottle” shop18 and executed a tenyear lease. For reasons unimportant, the landlord leased the property to someone else;
there was no indication that the lease terms were any different—the court gave no
indication that there might have been a change in the market value of the leasehold. Fera
sued, arguing that had it been able to lease the property it would have made profits over
the ten years. Fera, testifying as an expert on his own behalf, claimed $270,000 in lost
profits. The landlord’s expert testified that Fera would probably have lost money. The
jury awarded Fera $200,000 in lost profits.
The Michigan Supreme Court upheld the jury verdict, asserting that the claim for lost
profits by a new business is no different from the general rules regarding claims for lost
profits generally:
These cases and others since should not be read as stating a rule of law
which prevents every new business from recovering anticipated lost
profits for breach of contract. The rule is merely an application of the
doctrine that ‘(i)n order to be entitled to a verdict, or a judgment, for
damages for breach of contract, the plaintiff must lay a basis for a
reasonable estimate of the extent of his harm, measured in money’. 5
Corbin on Contracts, s 1020, p. 124. The issue becomes one of sufficiency
of proof. ‘The jury should not (be) allowed to speculate or guess upon this
question of the amount of loss of profits.’19
Thus framed, Fera’s recovery hinged on the sufficiency of proof. The court used the fact
that both parties spent a considerable amount of effort on proving damages as evidence
that the damage measure would not be speculative. It quoted the trial judge:

15 There is some behavioral evidence that introducing a high number, even a nonsense one, could have an
impact on the fact-finder’s decision, biasing it upward; for a good non-technical introduction to the
“anchoring” effect, see Daniel Kahneman, Thinking Fast and Slow, ch. 11.
16 242 N.W.2d 372, 92 A.L.R.3d 1278.
17 See E. Allan Farnsworth et al, Contracts: Cases and Materials (8 th ed.); John P. Dawson et al, Contracts:
Cases and Comment (10th ed.); Daniel Markovits, Contract Law and Legal Methods; Gerald E. Berendt, et
al, Contract Law and Practice (2d ed.); George W. Kuney and Robert M. Lloyd, Contracts: Transactions
and Litigation (3rd ed.).
18 A book store with a liquor license. Probably not a great business idea.
19 At 373-374. (emphasis added)
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The loss of profits are often speculative and conjectural on the part of
witnesses. When this is true, the Court should deny loss of profits because
of the speculative nature of the testimony and the proofs. However, the
law is also clear that where lost profits are shown, and there is ample proof
on this point, they should not be denied merely because they are hard to
prove. In this case, both parties presented testimony on this issue for days.
This testimony took the lost profits issue out of the category of speculation
and conjecture. The jury was given an instruction on loss of profits and
what the proofs must show, and the nature of the proofs, and if they found
them to be speculative they could not award damages therefor. The jury,
having found damages to exist, and awarded the same in this case in
accord with the proper instructions, the Court cannot, now, overrule the
jury’s finding.20
This is a funny argument. Because the parties tried to prove lost profits, the results were
not speculative, and, therefore, the jury should be allowed to find lost profit damages. I
don’t believe any other court has made that argument, although many of them do cite
Fera when justifying their conclusion that lost profits should be awarded.21
These jurors only had to sit through days of nonsense as opposed to the poor
jurors in Kenford who had to endure months. Still, the only purpose of the “factual”
inquiry was to mislead the jury. The estimates were not speculative; they were silly.
Fera’s claim was that he had taken a ten-year lease on a space in a shopping center for a
“book and bottle” shop and because the shopping center leased the space to someone else,
he had lost profits for the ten-year period. After the breach, he still had the concept, his
cash, and other potential spaces to lease. Awarding any lost profit damages assumes that
spending money on this shop in this location was better than any alternative he might
have had, which makes no sense.22
My colleague, Robert Scott, upon reading this, suggested that I was just cherry
picking “lousy lawyering” cases; the defendant’s lawyer should have been guilty of
malpractice. Unfortunately, it was the law, not the lawyering, that was the problem. As I
note below, Fera is cited with approval in a number of cases; none question the outcome.
It shows up in the treatises, without any questioning of the reasoning. I searched Westlaw
for scholarly articles citing Fera. There were 33, and, again, none questioned the
reasoning. The Farnsworth treatise includes it in a string citation, without comment, for
the proposition that the "rule of law which prevents every new business from recovering
anticipated lost profits" is rejected.23 The Corbin treatise trumpeted the fact that Fera had

20 At 646-647.
21 Citations.
22 For another instance in which the court allowed recovery of lost profits for a lease that wasn’t, see S.
Jon Kreedman & Co. v. Meyers Bros. Parking-Western Corp., 58 Cal.App.3d 173 (1976).
23
Citation.
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cited the previous edition;24 it was silent on the merits. Without a framework for analysis,
the decision has passed without criticism into the body of law.

2.

Super Valu Stores, Inc. v. Peterson25

Super Valu also concerned the breach of a promise to award a lease, but it adds one
twist—the disappointed promisee gave up a well-paying job in anticipation of getting a
fifteen-year lease. Peterson had been an employee for 24 years, had been president of a
division of Super Valu, and earned $100,000 per year (in Alabama in 1984). Since Super
Valu would not allow an employee to own a retail outlet he had to retire. The deal fell
through and Peterson succeeded in his claim that Super Valu had breached.
The trial court awarded damages for lost profits and the award was upheld on appeal.
Rejecting Super Valu’s argument that Alabama had a per se rule against awarding lost
profits for an unestablished business, the court adopted the “reasonable certainty”
standard and concluded that Peterson’s evidence was sufficient to meet that standard.26
What was that evidence? The court began with what seemed a promising statement:
The fundamental basis for Peterson’s evidence as to damages was Super
Valu’s own projections of profits, produced in its normal course of
business long before this dispute arose. These projections were the product
of an intense, exhaustive process involving many different Super Valu
personnel. Super Valu’s projections resulted from the application of a
scientific methodology that for many years had accurately predicted the
future performance of stores associated with Super Valu.27
The court emphasized the fact that the lost profits estimate was “based on predispute projections prepared by the defendant.28 The expert then took Super Valu’s
projected profit and loss statements for the first three years ($124,684, $619,267 and
$750,198) as the basis for projections for the remaining twelve years of the lease.
Unfortunately, there is a gap in the court’s exposition, so we do not know how the expert
went from these numbers to his conclusion. He concluded that over the fifteen years the
lost profits would be over $19 million.29 There must have been an assumption that the
24

“The court cited the prior edition of this section to show that a plaintiff must lay a basis for a reasonable
estimate of the extent of his harm, but held that lost profits could be recovered in a new business if they
could be proven with reasonable certainty, just as for any other business. The court cited the prior edition of
§ 1023 (now § 15.20) to show that it is just easier to establish a reasonable certainty of lost profits in the
case of an established business. The court cited the prior edition of § 1022 (now § 15.19) to show that
mathematical precision is not required, where by the nature of the circumstances, precision cannot be
attained, and particularly this is true where the defendant’s breach caused the imprecision.” ARTHUR L.
CORBIN, CORBIN ON CONTRACTS §56.16 n.19 (no. 16S1, 2016).
25 506 So.2d 317 (1987).
26 It cited Fera, amongst others in support of this position.
27 At 330. (emphasis in original)
28 At 331 (emphasis in original)
29 At 332. “The sophistication of these projections of lost profits, we believe, equals or exceeds that of the
projection methodology approved by this Court [in another case].”
7

growth in profits substantially exceeded the discount rate (assuming that the expert even
bothered to apply any discount rate). Having certified the $19 million estimate as credible,
the court then approved the jury verdict of $5 million. There was no hint as to why $19
million had shrunk to $5 million.
Of course, there was no basis for the $5 million either. There is no reason to
believe that a lease to operate a small supermarket would be a better investment
opportunity than any other. The expert’s estimate did not presume that Peterson brought
something exceptional to the project—the estimate was apparently based on Super Valu’s
projections with a generic operator. Peterson’s “lost profits” should have been zero. That
does not mean that he should not have been compensated at all. His compensation should
have been based on his reliance. He gave up a $100,000 per year job and, according to
the court, “Peterson expended time, energy, and money in undertaking the necessary
actions to properly equip, staff, and outfit the County Market.”30 Compensation for at
least some of Peterson’s reliance would be plausible.31 How much is unclear, but it would
certainly have been a lot less than the $5 million awarded by the jury.32
4. Beverly Hills Concepts, Inc. v. Schatz and Schatz, Ribicoff and Kotkin33
What makes this case of particular interest is the dissent by a very knowledgeable
contracts scholar, Ellen Peters. That she was fundamentally wrong adds to its significance.
Technically, the case was for lawyers’ malpractice, not breach of contract, but that can be
ignored. The malpractice, the court found, resulted in the failure of a new firm, Beverly
Hills Concepts (BHC). BHC’s primary business would have been the sale of franchises
for fitness clubs. Lost profits for a new business were, the court held, recoverable, subject
to the reasonable certainty standard. “The plaintiff argues that the present value of a
stream of expected future profits is an appropriate way to value a business and that it is
therefore an appropriate measure of damages. We conclude that it is proper to award
damages for the destruction of an unestablished enterprise and that lost profits may
constitute an appropriate measure of damages for the destruction of such an enterprise.”34
However, the majority concluded, the plaintiff failed to prove the damages with
30 At 335.
31
The decision does not indicate whether he was employed in the interim (or whether he should have been
employed); if so, any recovery would have to be reduced to take that into account.
32 For another case in which a potential lessee that had made some expenditures in reliance, was
improperly awarded lost profits and see Chung v. Kaonohi Center Co., 62 Haw. 594, 597 (1980). (“In
anticipation of operating the Chinese kitchen, plaintiffs arranged for financing, ordered equipment and
furnishings, hired chefs and workers, advertised in the yellow pages of the telephone book for the to-bebuilt kitchen, and incurred other expenses.”) In Energy Capital Corp. v. U.S., 302 F.3d 1314 (2002), HUD
breached a contract with a firm that was supposed to make up to $200 million worth of loans to owners of
HUD properties to install energy efficient heating systems. Rejecting the per se rule, the court found
damages of over $10 million. The court remanded because the trial court had used a risk-free discount rate,
holding that it should have used a risk-adjusted discount rate instead. The opportunity cost of this
hypothetical loan portfolio would be an alternative loan portfolio with an equivalent risk profile. Lost
profits should, therefore, have been zero. Energy Capital did incur costs in reliance and could have been
compensated for those.
33 247 Conn. 48 (1998)
34 At 63.
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reasonable certainty. The majority, I should note, cited both Super Valu and Fera as
examples of the successful use of the reasonable certainty standard.
The plaintiff’s expert witness projected sales of franchises (and resultant fees)
over a twelve-year period and concluded that the plaintiff had suffered a loss of $15.9
million. The majority concluded that the plaintiff had not produced sufficient evidence
that it would become profitable. It also asserted that “the trial court abused its discretion
in failing to limit the recovery of lost profits to a reasonable time period.”35
The opinion included sufficient information to buttress the conclusion that BHC
had suffered no loss (except for costs incurred in reliance). BHC first contacted the law
firm in late October 1987.36
The plaintiff’s financial statement, prepared by Coopers, revealed that it
was insolvent as of November 30, 1987, and its situation had deteriorated
even further by January, 1988. It is particularly telling that the plaintiff
had attempted to obtain financing from a number of banks as well as from
the Small Business Administration and that it had been rejected by all of
these institutions. According to Charles Remington, one of the plaintiff’s
officers, this financing was necessary to the proposed franchising
operation. Additionally, the model franchise opened by the plaintiff in
East Hartford quickly failed. Finally, despite several months of trying, the
plaintiff never sold a single franchise. Moreover, its own damages expert,
Ferreira, characterized the plaintiff as a poor credit risk. These facts serve
to indicate that the plaintiff was not financially stable and that its prospects
for earning profits in the future were, at best, questionable.37
Why would a firm be a poor credit risk unable to find a lender if it had available to it a
project worth $15.9 million? Because no one in their right mind believed it. There was no
basis for claiming that the project would exceed the opportunity cost; given the market
evidence, it was more likely that the expected present value was negative. Of course,
even expected negative present value projects can succeed. In her dissent Judge Peters
invoked Apple to illustrate how startups with sketchy finances sometimes succeed:
[T]he majority opinion starts out with an accurate description of the rocky
state of the plaintiff’s finances when it came to the defendants for legal
representation. To my mind, it is not surprising that start-up companies, in
the first years of their operation, would have a difficult time making ends
meet. It is not far-fetched to assume that Steve Jobs, when he started
35 At 77.The court made this odd argument: “We agree with the plaintiff that there is nothing inherently
improper about allowing damages for lost profits over a twelve year period. What is improper, however, is
to award damages over such a long time span when there is no evidence that the plaintiff would have
survived for twelve years, let alone that it would have remained profitable for that length of time.” (At 76)
The court did not indicate how one could possibly demonstrate that a new firm could survive for a
particular length of time.
36 At 52.
37 At 60-61.
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Apple Computers, might have had difficulty in obtaining financing for so
untested an idea as a personal computer. At that time, how could he have
projected future profits with analytic precision?38
That simply reinforces the notion that ex post some investments are great successes (and
some are not). For projects that were aborted, we have only the ex ante information and,
unless there is a credible reason to believe otherwise, the expected value of the loss
would be zero.
Judge Peters had a legitimate concern. The wrongdoer should not be allowed to
get away with its bad behavior without any liability. “We condone professional
misconduct if we discharge these defendants of all liability to a plaintiff that has tried, as
best it could, to quantify the loss that the defendants’ misconduct has caused it to
suffer.”39 The difficulty was that the doctrine had boxed the court in. It appeared to allow
for only two choices: either let experts dispute over “lost profits” or hold that the
measures were not reasonably certain and, therefore, damages would be zero. There was
a third way. By recognizing that the lost profit measure was spurious, we can focus
instead on what the plaintiff actually lost, namely, expenditures in reliance upon the
defendant’s not engaging in malpractice.
Judge Peters quoted an earlier opinion that would have limited the reviewing
court’s discretion in reviewing a damage award: “The amount of a damage award is a
matter peculiarly within the province of the trier of fact . . . . The size of the verdict alone
does not determine whether it is excessive. The only practical test to apply to this verdict
is whether the size of the verdict so shocks the sense of justice as to compel the
conclusion that the [trier of fact] was influenced by partiality, prejudice, mistake or
corruption.”40 If reviewing courts were to so constrain themselves, the likelihood is high
that juries would overcompensate plaintiffs.
5. Franchise Cases
In his treatise on the Recovery of Lost Profits, Robert Dunn argued in favor of
awarding lost profit damages to an aspiring franchisee:
The supposed rule that lost profits damages of an unestablished business
are not recoverable would seem to be least justifiable when the business to
be established is a location for a national franchise. Each store is cast
from the same mold. The locations are rigidly controlled by the national
franchisor. Projections are available based on extensive experience in
other stores from which sales and profits can be derived with a high
38 At 87.
39 At 95. She criticized the majority: “As a matter of principle, the majority opinion subscribes to the
position advanced by the defendants that, no matter how egregious and protracted their professional
misconduct, it is more appropriate for this court to take an unnecessarily rigorous view of proof of damages
than to provide relief for the plaintiff.” (At 80)
40 At 89. Quoting Grayson v. Wofsey, Rosen, Kweskin & Kuriansky, 231 Conn. at 183–84, 646 A.2d
195.(Internal quotation marks omitted.)
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degree of certainty. These projections are the basis for the franchisor’s
selection of the new location and the franchisee’s investment in it. If the
figures are good enough for the parties to invest their money, it would
seem that they should be good enough for a court.
* * *
If plaintiff can demonstrate that its operations at the new location would
be comparable to those at its existing location, then adequate probative
evidence may be introduced to demonstrate damages with the requisite
reasonable certainty.41
That sounds plausible, and many courts have bought it. But the relevant question should
not be whether the franchisee would do as well in this location as anywhere else. Rather
it should be whether there is reason to believe that it would do better, and the answer to
that should be negative. Indeed, the very notion of basing the compensation on the
earnings of comparable franchises presumes that the plaintiff would not do better. Nor
should the plaintiff have expected to do better than the opportunity cost of his capital or
his time. That does not mean that the plaintiff should not be compensated. The basis for
the compensation would not, however, be the lost profits as defined by Dunn.
As his illustration, Dunn chose a case that did not pit a franchisor against a
disappointed franchisee. In Smith Development Corp. v. Bilow Enterprises, Inc.,42
McDonald’s was the plaintiff. The defendant had, it was alleged, tortuously interfered
with MacDonald’s contractual relations. McDonald’s had entered into a conditional lease
of a parcel of property to add a franchised outlet. A competitor attempted to prevent the
entry of the competing restaurant. At trial the court held that there had been interference
with McDonald’s contract with the landowner. While the landowner did receive
compensation, McDonald’s was denied. The Rhode Island Supreme Court remanded for
errors in the charge to the jury, but it also considered whether McDonald’s would have
had a valid claim for damages. It first noted McDonald’s history of success:
McDonald’s marketing research manager had testified. He described the
uniformity of procedures utilized at all McDonald’s restaurants, its
training and national advertising programs, and the efforts made to
maintain standards and quality. This witness informed the judge and jury
that while in 1962 there were 800 units in operation, this number had
increased at trial time to 1,200. He also reported an amazing record of
successes—not one restaurant has failed. The trial justice ordered this
testimony be stricken.43
The court then concluded that compensation would be appropriate:
Having in mind America’s acceptance of McDonald’s method of
41 §§4.7-4.8. At 398-400.
42 112 R.I. 203 (1973).
43 At 213.
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merchandising, we believe the requisite evidentiary basis had been
established so that the jury could with ‘reasonable certainty’ make a
determination of the profit loss sustained as the result of McDonald’s
lengthy preoccupation with litigation, rather than the distribution of
hamburgers, at its Middletown location.44
The court did not indicate whether McDonald’s ever opened the outlet. That would not
matter for lost profits damages calculated a la Dunn. But it would make a difference if we
recognize that Dunn’s standard (and implicitly the court’s) is the wrong one. If the outlet
did open, then a plausible measure of the harm caused by the delay would be based on the
actual earnings; damages for delay are discussed in more detail in Section III. If the outlet
did not open, then damages should be based on McDonald’s reliance—for example, legal
costs incurred because of the defendant’s wrongful behavior. Neither of these remedies
bears any relationship to the “lost profits.”
6. Brundige v. Sherwin-Williams Co.45
I am not arguing that the lost profit remedy should never be used. Brundige
presents a situation in which the lost profit remedy would probably have been appropriate.
Brundige, who had a non-compete agreement, had been employed by Sherwin-Williams
for ten years at a particular location. Sherwin-Williams relocated, whereupon Brundige
quit and opened the business at the old location. The firm obtained a TRO to prevent his
operating the store; ultimately, the TRO was dissolved and Brundige sued for the losses
incurred by not operating during the period the TRO was in force. Brundige brought
many specific assets to the project, as the court noted:
In the case before us . . . the appellant had substantial experience in the
retail paint sales business; he undoubtedly had a reputation in the
community as a man of experience; his place of business was the same
building where a business like his had been located for some time; he did
open his business almost immediately after the injunction was dissolved;
and he made a profit his first month and every month thereafter for the
first six months he was in business.46
One could argue that it is precisely these characteristics that would have led SherwinWilliams to want to enforce the non-compete covenant in the first place. The court does
not say whether there would have been competition between the old and new locations.
Apparently, it concluded that any such competition did not justify enforcement of the
covenant. Having so concluded it then had to determine Brundige’s damages. Brundige
was sitting with a bunch of assets that were valuable only at this location and for this
purpose. The loss should be the return on these specific assets during the period the TRO
was in effect, and the best evidence of that would be the actual earnings after the TRO
was lifted. If Brundige had managed to earn anything during the interim period there
44 At 214.
45 551 S.W.2d 268 (1977)
46 At 271.
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could be an offset, but the basic point is that the expected returns would be positive,
taking into account the specific assets Brundige brought to the table.
Brundige illustrates an important qualification to the argument. If the plaintiff brings
specific assets to the project, the expected returns would be positive. These could be
assets that were acquired in reliance on this particular transaction, or they could simply
be assets that the plaintiff happened to have, assets that would be of use on this particular
project, but could not be easily deployed to another.
II.

Royalties, Etc.

The recent treatment of the new business rule in New York revolves around the
Kenford litigation. In the Appellate Court’s first shot, it was confronted with two
precedents. In 1918 the New York Court of Appeals took what was then the majority
position, holding in Cramer v. Grand Rapids Show Case Co.47 that a new business could
not recover for lost profits. Over half a century later, in Perma Research & Dev. Co. v.
Singer Co.,48 the Second Circuit, interpreting a contract under New York law, refined the
test: “Although lost profits in a new venture are not ordinarily recoverable (Cramer v.
Grand Rapids Show Case Co., 223 N.Y. 63, 119 N.E. 227 (1918)), they may be awarded
where: the loss of prospective profits are the direct and proximate result of the breach;
profits were contemplated by the parties when they entered the contract; and there is a
rational basis on which to calculate the lost profits.”49 The Kenford Appellate Court
interpreted Perma Research as qualifying Cramer: “What the court did in Perma
Research, in essence, was to add a third requirement for new businesses by requiring
them to establish some rational basis on which to calculate the lost profits. By so holding,
the court converted the Cramer rule of nonrecoverability into a rule of evidence.”50
The “rational basis” test was soundly rejected by the Court of Appeals: “It is our
view that the record in this case demonstrates the efficacy of the principles set forth by
this court in [Cramer], principles to which we continue to adhere. In so doing, we
specifically reject the ‘rational basis’ test enunciated in [Perma Research] and adopted by
the Appellate Division.”51 And so, it would appear, New York continues to honor the per
se rule. The Court of Appeals opinion was unanimous (indeed per curiam).
Less than a decade later the same court was confronted with another new business
claim in Ashland Management Inc. v. Janien,52 and again produced a unanimous opinion.
The court invoked its Kenford decision, but instead of the per se rule, it characterized
Kenford as holding that for “a new business seeking to recover loss of future profits, a
stricter standard is imposed because there is no experience from which lost profits may
47 223 N.Y. 63 (1918).
48
402 F. Supp. 881, 898 (S.D.N.Y. 1975) aff'd sub nom. Perma Research & Dev. v. Singer Co., 542 F.2d
111 (2d Cir. 1976)
49 At ___.
50
At 140.
51 Kenford Co., Inc. v. Erie County, 67 N.Y.2d 257, 263; 493 N.E.2d 234, 502 N.Y.S.2d 131.
52 82 N.Y.2d 395 (1993).
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be estimated with reasonable certainty and other methods of evaluation may be too
speculative. . . . Whether the claim involves an established business or a new business,
however, the test remains the same, i.e., whether future profits can be calculated with
reasonable certainty.”53
How can we reconcile the court’s notion that, on the one hand, it is applying the
Kenford per se rule (no lost profits for an unestablished business) while finding that the
plaintiff only had to satisfy the reasonable certainty standard (and did so)? Logically, I
don’t think we can. If, however, we recognize that the new business rule lumped together
very different types of claims, the outcome (if not the rationale) makes more sense. In the
cases in Section I, the claim was for consequential damages—because you breached, I
did not make an investment on which I would have made a lot of money. In Perma
Research and Ashland and similar cases, the claim is for direct damages—I sold you an
asset for a future stream of payments and you have not paid. The expected value in the
former case (subject to the qualifications noted above) was zero; in the latter case, it was
positive.
1. Perma Research
Perma Research assigned its patents for an automotive anti-skid device to Singer
and was to receive royalty payments. Since the devices had not yet been perfected the
agreement required continued collaboration. Singer decided not to proceed and the court
held that by failing to use its best efforts Singer had breached the agreement. The trial
judge found damages of about $7 million after prejudgment interest was included. The
Court of Appeals approved, but it provided only generic language in support: “In simple
terms, the measure of the damage is the amount necessary to put the injured party in
exact position as he would have been if the contract had not been breached. If Singer had
put its resources and ingenuity to the anti-skid device, it probably would have been
successful in the marketing of the same. Nor are the damages too speculative to assess.
At the outset, since Singer produced the damage, it must bear the uncertainty of proof.”54
The decision does not specify how the court arrived at the damage estimate, although it
appears that it simply projected sales (presuming that the product would have been
perfected), multiplied by the royalty rate, and, perhaps, found the present discounted
value of the projected stream of royalty payments.
If we accept the court’s conclusion on liability, then it is clear that Perma
Research did suffer a loss. It had already incurred the costs of getting the product to the
point of being nearly marketable. It still had some financial obligations, but these were
minor. We could look at either the expected return on the investment or the costs it had
incurred as a starting point in calculating damages. There is no reason to believe that a
remedy based on either of these would yield the same result as the “lost profits,” the
projected stream of royalty payments. In the absence of any contract language to the
contrary, Perma Research should have received compensation.

53 At 404.
54 At 116.
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But the contract was not silent as the dissent observed: “The contract provided
that defendant ‘in its absolute discretion shall determine the method of manufacturing,
exploiting and marketing the Product’ but gave plaintiff the right to reacquire its device if
defendant failed to spend at least one hundred thousand dollars for ‘marketing, promoting
and advertising’ in any year beginning with 1966.”55 Moreover, Singer was obligated to
pay roughly $500,000 even if it produced no units.56 My concern is not whether the
contract language supplanted the default damage rule. The point I want to emphasize is
that when, as in this case, the bulk of the plaintiff’s costs have already been incurred, the
expected value of the claim is positive, not zero as in the previous Section.
2. Ashland Management Inc. v. Janien
Janien was an employee of an investment advisory company. He developed a
stock selection strategy, Eta, for the firm. There was some dispute as to whether the
contract that he and the firm had been negotiating was binding and the court concluded
that it was. That contract said that “if ‘for any reason’ Janien left Ashland’s employment
he was entitled to ‘a royalty of the higher of $50,000 or 15% of gross revenues per annum
of any and all existing or future accounts’ using the Eta model or ‘any derivative thereof’.
The gross revenue was the 1% fee charged customers by Ashland for the funds under
management.”57 After he was fired, Ashland sought a permanent injunction to bar Janien
from using Eta. Janien counterclaimed for damages, his lost profits under the contract.
After reaffirming the Kenford per se rule, the court then misapplied it, finding that
Janien could recover lost profits, notwithstanding that this was a new business. The court
concluded that “it is manifest from an examination of [the contract] that the parties
contemplated that Janien could recover damages if the agreement was not completed and
that those damages could include lost profits from accounts using Eta.”58
[T]he issue of future earnings was not only contemplated but also fully
debated and analyzed by sophisticated business professionals at the time
of these extended contract negotiations, projections of the increments to be
anticipated over the years were calculated and provisions made for
Janien’s share of the anticipated profits. Inasmuch as Janien was entitled
to damages based upon the revenues derived from “any and all existing or
future” accounts, plaintiff must have foreseen that if it breached the
contract defendant would be entitled to lost profits.59
The court then concluded that Janien had met the burden of proving lost profits
with reasonable certainty. But, like Perma Research, the issue should not have been
certainty. Janien had already developed Eta; the investment had already been sunk. His
damage claim was only for the future stream of earnings from his investment. Had the

55 At 120.
56 At 120.
57 At 400-401.
58 At 404-05.
59 At 405.
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court framed the question in this way it could have avoided the intellectual contortions it
engaged in by attempting to conform the result to the Kenford per se rule.
3. MindGames, Inc. v. Western Pub. Co., Inc. 60
MindGames is another case involving royalty payments for a preexisting item.
The developer of a game, Clever Endeavor, licensed it to Western, a major marketer of
games. Western would pay a 15% royalty for around four years. In addition, Western had
an annual option to renew for $300,000 per year. In the first year the royalty payment was
$600,000 but afterwards sales fell precipitously. Western, according to MindGames,
breached the agreement by its inadequate promotional effort.61 The opinion is unclear as
to the nature of the plaintiff’s damage theory. It appears to be that but for the alleged
inadequate performance of Western, a lot more games would have been sold and (I think
but the opinion is really unclear about this) the agreement would have been renewed so
that even more games could have been sold in the future.
The trial judge, invoking a 75-year-old Arkansas decision,62 held that the new
business rule barred recovery of lost profits and granted summary judgment to Western.
On appeal, Judge Posner concluded that, given the chance, Arkansas would overrule that
precedent and would abandon the new business rule.63 In its stead he would use “the
serviceable and familiar standard of excessive speculativeness.”64 He rejected the new
business rule and replaced it with a standard that would apply to new and existing
businesses alike.
Just as a start-up company should not be permitted to obtain pie-in-the-sky
damages upon allegations that it was snuffed out before it could begin to
operate (unlike the ice factory in Marvell, which did begin production,
albeit a little later than planned), … capitalizing fantasized earnings into a
huge present value sought as damages, so a novice writer should not be
permitted to obtain damages from his publisher on the premise that but for
the latter's laxity he would have had a bestseller, when only a tiny fraction
of new books achieve that success. Damages must be proved, and not just
dreamed.65

60 218 F.3d 652 C.A.7 (Wis.),2000.
61 According to the dissent: “MindGames' complaint alleged that a substantial number of games produced
by Western failed to meet quality standards; Western failed to promote and make reasonable efforts to sell;
and its efforts did not meet standards under the agreement or those recognized in the industry. It is
MindGames' position that these failures caused loss of sales.” (At 660)
62
Marvell Light & Ice Co. v. General Electric Co., 162 Ark. 467, 259 S.W. 741 (1924).
63 In rejecting the new business rule, Judge Posner claimed that it could lead to an absurd result: “Suppose
a first-time author sued a publisher for an accounting, and the only issue was how many copies the
publisher had sold. Under the ‘new business’ rule as construed by Western, the author could not recover his
lost royalties even though there was no uncertainty about what he had lost.” (At 657) However, there is no
reason to believe that the rule would prevent recovery of past due payments.
64 At 658.
65 At 658.
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The plaintiff had claimed future royalties of $40 million, which would have required
sales of about 10 million games.66 In rejecting the claim, Judge Posner emphasized the
plaintiff’s lack of a track record. “He could not point to other games that he had invented
and that had sold well.”67 Because “[i]t pointed to no evidence from which lost royalties
could be calculated to even a rough approximation . . . [he found] its silence eloquent and
Western's argument compelling, and so the judgment in favor of Western is affirmed.”68
Indeed, he asserted, “[w]hen the breach occurred, MindGames should have terminated
the contract and sought distribution by other means . . . . The fact that it did not do so—
that so far as appears it has made no effort to market ‘Clever Endeavor’ since the market
for the game collapsed in 1991—is telling evidence of a lack of commercial promise
unrelated to Western's conduct.”69 Since the contract gave Western a renewal option, and
since it did not renew, MindGames’ claim would have been based on future sales by an
unidentified third party. The fact that it found no such third party does suggest that the
future royalty stream would have not amounted to much.
But probably more than zero. MindGames might have been able to argue that Western
had destroyed the brand image by producing a poor product; had it produced a quality
product, the future sales would have been greater. Yes, projecting those sales would have
been speculative, but it could be done; to reach that step MindGames would first have to
show that the quality of the games was so substandard that industry experts would testify
that the reputation could not be salvaged.70 If it surmounted that hurdle, then the parties
could put forth competing estimates of future sales and royalties. To be sure, some of the
estimates would be absurd. If the parties did not constrain the damages ex ante, then a
judge could impose some logic on the process ex post. Both the “new business” and the
“reasonable certainty” approach give the judge one blunt weapon to rein in the experts—
the threat of zero.
This was a classic case of a plaintiff winning the battle but losing the war. The court
rejected the per se new business defense, but then held that because damages were too
speculative, they would, therefore, be zero. Compounding the plaintiff’s pain, Judge
Posner noted: “Although the victim of a breach of contract is entitled to nominal
damages, . . . MindGames does not seek them . . . . By not seeking nominal damages,
incidentally, MindGames may have lost a chance to obtain significant attorneys' fees, to
which Arkansas law entitles a prevailing party in a breach of contract case.”71 Had the
case been remanded, as the dissent proposed, MindGames might at least have recovered
its attorney fees.
In the well-known case of Freund v. Washington Square Press, Inc.72 the court did
award only nominal damages (six cents) to an author when a publisher chose not to
66 At 654. The decision does not indicate the basis for this projection.
67 At 659.
68 At 659.
69 At 659.
70 I presume that the contract was silent on Western’s meeting any quality standard and the consequences,
if any, of a failure to do so.
71 At 654.
72 41 A.D.2d 371, 343 N.Y.S.2d 401 (1973) modified, 34 N.Y.2d 379, 314 N.E.2d 419 (1974).
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publish his book. While not explicitly invoking the new business rule, the New York
Court of Appeals held: “His expectancy interest in the royalties—the profit he stood to
gain from sale of the published book—while theoretically compensable, was
speculative. . . . . In these circumstances, his claim for royalties falls for uncertainty.”73
There are two problems with this. First, Freund did not attempt to prove lost royalties, nor
did he even ask for them. The denial was pure dictum.74 Second, the contract gave Freund
a sizable advance against royalties, so he was implicitly compensated for the royalties on
about 2,000 books.75 Recovery could be denied, not because the claimant had a new
business, but because it could not plausibly show that the future royalties would have
exceeded the advance. Again, as in Perma Research, I do not claim that the ex ante
payment does, or should, supplant the default rule. The essential point is that when the
claim is for lost royalties, the expected loss would be positive.
III.

Delay and Defect

In MindGames, Judge Posner noted: “The rule of Hadley v. Baxendale, often
prevents the victim of a breach of contract from obtaining lost profits, but that rule is not
invoked here. Neither the ‘new business’ rule nor the rule of Hadley v. Baxendale stands
for the general proposition that lost profits are never a recoverable item of damages in a
tort or breach of contract case.”76 In Hadley, of course, the breach caused a delay. Delay
was also the issue in a number of new business cases. Interestingly, one of the earliest
involved a contract entered into the year before the Hadley decision and it concerned the
delayed construction of a flour mill (Abbott v. Gatch).77
1.

Delay

In Abbott v. Gatch, a contractor was found to have missed the contractual
deadline for constructing a mill by about three months. The court rejected the owner’s
claim for lost profits:
We cannot adopt any estimate of profits that Abbott might have realized
from working the mill, because these were merely speculative, depending
on the quantity of flour it might grind, the fluctuations of the market, as to
prices of flour and grain, and the remote contingencies of his being able to
procure wheat, labor and fuel, as well as the continuance of the mill in
running order, free from accidents and loss of time from other causes.78
However, this did not mean that the owner would not receive any compensation.
“Considering the uncertainties attending the milling business, and the difficulty of
defining a safer guide for juries, we are of opinion, that a fair rent is the most reasonable
73 At 383.
74 It has misled many commentators; see, for example, Melvin Eisenberg, “Probability and Chance in
Contract Law,” 45 UCLA Law Review 1005, 1056-57 (1998).
75 For more detail on Freund, see Goldberg, Rethinking Contract Law and Contract Design, ch. 5.
76 At 655.
77 13 Md. 314 (1859).
78 At 333-34.
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standard of the defendant’s loss by reason of the plaintiff’s failure to complete the
mill.”79 The court gave no indication as to how a “fair rent” should be determined. There
are a number of possible measures, none very good. One possibility, albeit unlikely,
would be the expected revenues less the projected operating costs and cost of capital
(which would amount to projected lost profits minus the cost of capital). That would
entail the same problems the court recognized when rejecting “lost profits.” A second
possibility would be to apply a discount rate to construction costs (or the construction
plus land acquisition costs). A third would find a comparable, although it is hard to
imagine that there are any rented flour mills to compare with.
This was not just a nineteenth century anomaly. The rental value measure showed
up again in Evergreen Amusement Corp. v. Milstead,80 decided in 1955. A contractor was
hired to clear a site for the construction of a drive-in theater. There was a delay, probably
attributable to inaccuracies in the initial survey, which made the project much more
difficult. There was a dispute over who should pay for the additional 8,000 cubic yards of
dirt required to complete the project. Evergreen withheld payment for that work and the
contractor sued. Evergreen then counterclaimed for lost profits as a result of the delay.
The court denied the counterclaim, invoking the new business rule. Citing Abbott v.
Gatch, the court concluded: “We think the [trial] court was right in basing the damages
for delay in the completion of the site on fair rental value and the actual monetary losses
incurred.”81 Again, the court was silent on how one might determine the fair market
rental value of a drive-in theater.
Alternatively, the plaintiff could argue that since the mill or theater had been
completed and was operable, a reasonable estimate of the harm could be based on the
actual operations in a given period. That was the approach taken (unsuccessfully) by the
claimant in Cramer v. Grand Rapids Show Case Co.82 When it reasserted the per se rule
in Kenford, the New York Court of Appeals harkened back to Cramer. That case
involved the delayed delivery of furniture (price $1,376.75) necessary for opening a retail
store. The trial judge instructed the jury: “If a man has arranged to start a business at a
certain time, and is prevented from starting it by reason of wrong or breach of contract by
somebody else, he is entitled to recover whatever profits he can show he would have
made during that time for the breach of contract by the other party.”83 The plaintiff had
relied on data on sales and costs after it finally opened in determining its lost profits,
arguably for a comparable period of time. It claimed lost profits of about $6,000 and
additional losses of around $800. The jury award did not break damages out by category.
It awarded $3,310 and the trial judge reduced the award further to $1,500. The jury
instruction, said the Court of Appeals, was reversible error. Only data from past
performance would be allowed and it would be impossible for a new business to generate
such data.

79 At 334.
80 206 Md. 610 (1955).
81
At 621.
82 223 N.Y. 63 (1918).
83 At 67.
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If the only question was whether such data would be adequate for proving losses, the
result was surely wrong. The parties might quibble about the appropriate time period for
comparison and other issues, but the data would be just as real as the data that an existing
firm would have presented. The more significant question is the Hadley question. Putting
it in the “tacit assumption” framework, fashionable at that time (and still one that I
prefer),84 would a seller of furniture know that if it were late the buyer could not open its
business, and would it agree that it would pay for all lost profits prior to the opening,
even though it knows virtually nothing about the nature of the buyer’s business? I would
say No; others might disagree, but for my purposes in this paper the important point is
that the fact that Cramer’s was a new business was irrelevant for determining the
damages.
Marvell Light & Ice Co. v. General Electric Co.85 was similar to Cramer. Marvell
was the Arkansas precedent cited in MindGames, for the notion that there was a per se
rule against awarding lost profits for a new business. Judge Posner quite properly noted
that it was a delay case and questioned why a court would have found computation of
damages difficult.
Marvell was a classic Hadley v. Baxendale type of case—in fact
virtually a rerun of Hadley, except that the appellants alleged that they had
notified the seller of the icemaking machinery of the damages that they
would suffer if delivery was delayed, and the seller had agreed to be liable
for those damages. The decision is puzzling in light of that allegation; it is
doubly puzzling because, assuming that by the time of the trial the ice
factory was up and running, it should not have been difficult to compute
the damages that the appellants had lost by virtue of the five and a half
month delay in placing the factory in operation. Presumably it would have
had five and a half months of additional profits.86
He is, of course, correct. Unlike in the opportunity cost cases, the losses were real and
easy to measure. The only question should have been whether the Hadley rule precluded
recovery.
In Cook Associates, Inc. v. Warnick87 the lost profits claim did succeed and the court
specifically addressed the Hadley issue.88 Cook was constructing a manufacturing plant
which opened eight months late because the supplier, Chief, failed to deliver parts on
time.89 Cook sued and the jury awarded lost profits based on the actual operation in the

84 See Goldberg, Rethinking, ch. 8.
85 162 Ark. 467, 259 S.W. 741 (1924).
86 At 655.
87 664 P.2d 1161 (1983).
88 For another delay case in which the court rejected the per se rule, see Drews Co. v. Ledwith-Wolfe
Associates, Inc., 296 S.C. 207, 214, 371 S.E.2d 532, 536 (1988). However, the court concluded that the
claimant’s proof was inadequate and awarded nothing.
89 Cook brought suit against both the manufacturer, Chief, and the dealer, Warnick. The latter was
exonerated. (At 1164)
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first two months, $56,908.90 As in the previous two cases, there is no real question about
the adequacy of proof—the actual profits after the plant was on line were a good enough
proxy for the profits missed during the delay. Chief, urged “adoption of the ‘tacit
agreement test’ of foreseeability.”91 However, the court noted that the tacit assumption
test had been rejected by the UCC and concluded that the “evidence is sufficient to
support a conclusion that Chief had reason to know that an inordinate delay on its part
could prevent Cook’s production and sale of slurry, thereby causing a loss of profits.”92 I
am not concerned with whether or not the finding is correct; given its finding, the court
framed the question in Hadley terms and held, in effect, that the seller bore the risk of the
costs arising from delay.
2.

Defects

In the delay cases where the plaintiff did subsequently operate, the actual earnings
could provide a reasonable estimate of the damages. The recoverability of those damages
would be subject to two qualifications. The first was the possibility that the Hadley rule
would bar recovery.93 The second was the possibility that the parties contracted over the
issue with either a disclaimer or a damage limitation. Defect cases raise similar questions.
I will focus on two in which the courts held that the lost profits were recoverable but then
rejected the claim on measurability grounds.
a. Mid-America Tablewares, Inc. v. Mogi Trading Co., Ltd.94
In Mid-America, the defendant stipulated that there had been a breach of express
warranty, breach of implied warranty of merchantability, and breach of implied warranty
of fitness for a particular purpose, so the only issue was damages. The buyer had been in
the table linen business and wanted to launch a dinnerware business to complement it. It
entered into a contract with Mogi, a Japanese firm, to provide the ceramic dinnerware.
Unfortunately, the dinnerware exceeded FDA regulatory guidance levels for leachable
lead. Mid-America stopped shipping the dinnerware to its customers and recalled all that
had already been shipped. The jury found incidental damages of around $57,000.95 At
issue was the claim for lost profits, about $300,000 in the first year (1994) and $2.6
million over the next decade.96

90 At 1163-64) Cook had asked for $100,000. According to the court the average monthly profits for the
first thirteen months of operation were $35,650, which would have meant lost profits of roughly $280,000.
There is no discussion of the discrepancy.
91 At 1167.
92 At 1167.
93 The Hadley rule is typically referred to as “foreseeability.” I find that to be an unhelpful and misleading
term; see Rethinking, ch. 8-10. For those who feel comfortable with it, feel free to substitute it for Hadley
in the text.
94 100 F.3d 1353 (1996).
95 The court did not say what was included under “incidental damages”; I presume that it included the
costs of the recall and, perhaps, some of the costs of management time dealing with the problem.
96 Cite. The defendant did not contest the 1994 damages.
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The Seventh Circuit panel, asserting that to deny recovery for lost profits “would
be tantamount to holding that the defendant could breach this particular contract with
impunity,” held that Wisconsin would permit recovery of lost profits for a new
business.97 Invoking both Fera and Super Valu, it continued, “The determination as to
whether future profits were within the contemplation of the parties when contracting
necessarily turns on the specific facts established at trial. . . . There is no basis to
conclude that evidence as to the foreseeability of Mid–America’s lost future profits
should be excluded as a matter of law.”98 The evidence presented by Mid-America’s
expert witnesses was the best available evidence and therefore it could not be excluded as
a matter of law.
After arguing at length that the lost profits claim was not barred, the court then
rejected the expert’s damage estimate for the post-1994 period holding that it was
“monstrously excessive.”99 It criticized the expert’s sales projections as being wildly
optimistic and remanded for further proceedings. The court did not say whether this
component of damages should be determined on retrial or whether the claim was too
speculative and should therefore be zero. The defense expert had attacked various
elements of the projections, but even he conceded that “there clearly were lost profits.”100
However, this claim is basically the same as Fera’s and others from Section I. There is no
reason to believe that the rewards to future expenditure on this project would be any
better than anything else Mid-America could have done with the same funds. The lost
profits would be zero, not because of a per se rule, but because the expected value of the
future expenditures on this project is the opportunity cost of the funds.101
b. Olathe v Browning102
In Mid-America, the buyer did not make further expenditures, hence the zero profit
outcome. In Olathe v Browning the buyer did continue and that raised a different question.
I must note first that, unlike Mid-America, the existence of a limitation on remedies was
a significant issue. As is quite common, Browning sold its goods conditional on a repair
and replace remedy limitation. Or, at least it tried to do so. A considerable portion of the
opinion (about 8,000 words) dealt with whether the limitation was part of the contract
and the court concluded that, as a matter of law, it was not.103 Thus, it was open to Olathe
to prove damages, including lost profits damages. However, the trial court and the Kansas
Supreme Court ultimately rejected the expert witness’s damage measurement, concluding
that it was too speculative.

97 For an argument that this was an inaccurate statement of Wisconsin law, see L. Katie Mason, “MidAmerica Tablewares, Inc. v. Mogi Trading Co.: The Seventh Circuit’s Tasty Recipe For New Business
Recovery Of Future Lost Profits Under Wisconsin Law, Or A Suspicious Side Dish Wisconsin Won’t Try?”
2005 Wis. L. Rev. 1385
98 At 1362-3
99 At 1367.
100 At 1376.
101
Mid-America might have argued that because of its existing table linen business it had complementary
assets which made the expected returns in the dinnerware market greter than the opportunity cost of capital.
102 259 Kan. 735 (1996).
103 I confess that I found the court’s reasoning unpersuasive.

22

Browning manufactured bearings, which were a component part for a new product
that Olathe designed and sold, the 866 Tub Grinder. Because the 866 Tub Grinder was a
new product, this would be classified as a new business, potentially subject to the new
business rule. The bearings failed causing the tub grinders to malfunction. Olathe sued
for damages for the tub grinders that had been damaged and for lost profits on its future
sales. Unlike Mid-America, it continued in the business. To understand the damage
theories, it is necessary to note that the failure was on the 10-foot tub grinders and that
this model was subsequently supplanted by the 12-foot tub grinder. Because the first trial
ended in a mistrial, Olathe’s expert presented two estimates. For the first trial, he argued
that Olathe’s damaged reputation resulted in a loss of sales; lost profits were $4.3
million.104 However, at his deposition before the second trial, the economic expert
“admitted that his planned testimony for the first trial—that Olathe lost $4.3 million in
lost profits due to the lost sales of 10–foot tub grinders—was 100% wrong.” 105 Olathe’s
market share (of 10-foot grinders) did not fall. In fact, it was greater than had been
expected had the bearing problems not occurred. Undaunted, he proposed a different
theory.106 Because it had to put so much of its resources into redesigning the 10-foot
grinders, its development of the12-foot grinders was delayed and the delay resulted in a
loss of its share of the 12-foot grinder market.107 This resulted in an estimate of lost
profits of about $8 million.108
Olathe argued that under the “certainty” rule it only had to prove that it had
actually suffered damages and that certainty was not necessary to prove the actual
amount. In upholding the trial judge’s decision to bar the expert’s testimony, the court
said: “Olathe’s evidence regarding the new lost profit theory was based on rumors,
guesses, and assumptions. Thus, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in holding that
the lost profit evidence was speculative as a matter of law.”109 Note two things. First, it
presumes implicitly that there is some boundary at which “rumors, guesses, and
assumptions” are so egregious that there is a shift from a matter of fact to a matter of law.
Second, the court’s concern appears to be the quality of the inputs, not the damage theory
itself. If only the expert had been more rigorous in assembling the data, the damage
report would have been admissible.
The issue should not have been the certainty of the damage estimate; the expert
was measuring the wrong thing. Olathe’s expected damages, beyond the costs
associated with the damaged grinders and the possible redesign effort, were the delay
costs and, as noted above, these should be subject to the Hadley rule—what would be
the expected cost of coming to the market a few months later (mainly, the time value of
money).110 The delay would entail a real loss and the contract would determine which
104 At 758.
105 At 761.
106
There was no explanation for Olathe’s decision to use the same expert the second time around.
107 “[A]ccording to Olathe, . . . it was required to pour all of its resources into the redesign of the 10–foot
tub grinder and that Olathe would have used these resources to develop a 12–foot tub grinder had the
bearings in the 10–foot grinder not been faulty.” (At 765-6)
108 At 760.
109 At 767.
110 That is the equivalent of the rental value in Abbott and Evergreen.
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party would bear the risk. If recovery were to be denied, the reason should not be the
newness of the business; rather it should be that by creating a forcing default, the
parties would be induced to deal with the problem ex ante with a disclaimer or
liquidated damages clause. Ironically, in this instance the court went out of its way to
hold as a matter of law that these defenses were not available.
IV.

Anticipatory Repudiation

Suppose that a seller has begun performance of a long-term contract, but it has not
yet delivered any output. If the buyer were to breach, would the seller have a viable claim
for lost profits? There are two different scenarios. In the first, at the time of the buyer’s
repudiation there had been no market change. In the second, market conditions had
deteriorated.
In Tractebel Energy Marketing, Inc. v. AEP Power Marketing, Inc.111 the trial
judge misused the new business rule in denying the plaintiff’s recovery. To simplify the
facts, the seller (AEP) agreed to build a power plant and the buyer agreed to a twentyyear take-or-pay contract. After the seller had spent about $500 million on the plant, but
before it actually had produced any power, the market collapsed and the buyer (TEMI)
repudiated. The trial judge denied recovery for lost profits on two grounds—the project
was a new business and determination of lost profits was too speculative. I will come to
the “speculative” question below, but first I want to consider the new business issue, with
a variation on the facts.
Suppose, contrary to fact, that the market conditions had not changed at all—
should the seller receive any compensation? In one sense the problem is the same as that
in Fera. There is no reason to believe that subsequent performance of this contract would
be any more profitable for AEP than its alternatives. The difference is that in Fera the
plaintiff had not made any investments in reliance on the lease. Here, AEP had spent
$500 million. There should be no recovery for future lost profits. Since market conditions
had not changed, the expected value of the future stream of profits had not changed.
However, compensation based on AEP’s reliance would be relevant. That would depend
on the alternative use of the power plant. If it had no feasible alternatives one could argue
that the buyer should be liable for the entire $500 million and if instead it could
seamlessly switch to selling to an alternative customer, the reliance damages would be
zero.112
In the actual case the market had in fact collapsed; the expected value of the
contract to the seller had risen, reflecting the change in the market. Here, there are
damages and their existence has nothing to do with the newness of the business. Damages
were assessed by dueling experts. The seller’s expert witness concluded that damages
were $520 million while the buyer’s concluded that there had been no loss at all. The trial
judge was not impressed by either expert: “I found both experts provided unreliable
testimony and worse yet, it appeared to be clouded by their obvious advocacy, to
paraphrase a popular show tune, on behalf of the lady they came in with.”113 But even if
111 2006 WL 147586. This is the trial court decision.
112 See the discussion of Brundige, Section I. 6.
113 Trial court, 2006, p. 3. Reconsideration Order.
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they had done impeccable work, he would not have accepted it; it would have been too
speculative:
In order to know what AEP’s revenues would be over the next twenty
years, one would have to be able to presage a vast and varied body of facts.
Any projection of lost profits would necessarily include assumptions
regarding the price of electricity and the costs of operating over twenty
years. One would also need to surmise what competing forms of energy
such as coal and nuclear energy would cost over the same time period.
Also factoring into this calculation are the political and regulatory
developments over twenty years, population growth in the Entergy region,
and technological advances affecting the production of power and related
products. With so many unknown variables, these experts might have done
as well had they consulted tealeaves or a crystal ball.114
So, he concluded, the damages were zero.115
The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that AEP’s “lost profits” was indeed the
appropriate damage remedy.116 It concluded that while the projection of lost profits
would be difficult it was not “speculative;” it is, in effect, the same exercise the parties
engaged in when negotiating the twenty-year contract in the first place. I want to make
two points. First, neither “speculative” nor “certainty” is helpful in determining whether
there should be compensation. Is it easier to assess damages in this contract, with a
twenty-year horizon and with both quantity and price variable, than in any of the ones
discussed above in which the court first said the new business rule no longer precluded
recovery, but then denied recovery because the measurement was too uncertain? Courts
have been content to fall back on “certainty,” using it as a wild card to reward some
claimants and not others.
Second, in most of the cases discussed above the lost profit claim was for
consequential damages. In Tractebel, the lost profits claim should be viewed as being for
direct damages. That is, the contract was an asset for the seller and when the market
collapsed the value of that asset went up. How much? That is the measure of what the
seller lost at the time of repudiation. It would be the difference between the expected net
revenues had the market conditions not changed and the net revenues given that there had
been a change. That difference is precisely what the experts were attempting to ascertain
under the lost profit rubric—the net present value of the difference between two projected
revenue streams.117
V. Concluding Remarks
In MindGames, Judge Posner rejected the new business rule:
114 Trial court, 2005, p. 11-12.
115 At 8.
116
Tractebel Energy Marketing, Inc. v. AEP Power Marketing, Inc., 487 F.3d 89 (2007).
117 I have elaborated on this in “Reckoning Contract Damages: Valuation of the Contract as an Asset.”
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The rule doesn't work because it manages to be at once vague and
arbitrary. One reason is that the facts that it makes determinative, “new,”
“business,” and “profits,” are not facts, but rather are the conclusions of a
reasoning process that is based on the rationale for the rule and that as a
result turns the rule into an implicit standard. What, for example, is a “new”
business? What, for that matter, is a “business”? And are royalties what
the rule means by “profits”?118
Courts have fiddled with all these questions to determine whether or not a particular
claimant should be allowed to recover. Sometimes they will uphold the per se rule but
then decide that the business is not new.119 As we have seen in a number of instances,
they will find that there is no per se rule, but they will decline to award lost profits for
various reasons, often invoking certainty. In other cases, courts will claim that certainty is
needed only to show the existence of lost profits and that there is a lower standard to
show the magnitude of the loss. Some courts have judged the lost profits measure by an
even lower standard; recall Judge Peters criterion: does “the size of the verdict so shock
the sense of justice as to compel the conclusion that the [trier of fact] was influenced by
partiality, prejudice, mistake or corruption.”120
Judge Posner elaborated on his dismissal of the new business rule: “The rule
could be made sensible by appropriate definition of its terms, but we find it hard to see
what would be gained, given the existence of the serviceable and familiar standard of
excessive speculativeness.”121 However, I have argued here that speculativeness, or
reasonable certainty, is the wrong way to go. The problem is not difficulties in
measurement. Rather, it is that the courts have often been measuring the wrong thing. In
cases in which the claim is for a future stream of profits on a project that never got off the
ground, the presumption should be that there were no lost profits. Any recovery should be
based on the plaintiff having some assets (either preexisting or acquired in reliance) the
value of which was contingent on performance of the project. For other cases (royalty
streams, delay, defect) claimants have suffered a real loss. Whether they should recover
does not depend on whether they are a new business or the certainty of proof. The Hadley
rule provides one constraint. Ex ante contract language (liquidated damages, warranty
disclaimers, remedy limitations) provides another.

118 At 657.
119 RSB Lab. Servs., Inc. v. BSI, Corp., 368 N.J. Super. 540, 847 A.2d 599, (App. Div. 2004).
120 See text at __.
121 At 658.
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